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  Intel’s Alleged Schemes Affected U.S. Consumers 
 
       Robert H. Lande1 
        
 The European Commission’s July 26 charges against Intel 
for monopoly abuses were not just decisions by a far-off body 
to prevent a corporate giant’s foreign excesses from harming 
Europeans. It actually was a watershed event - one likely to 
benefit consumers everywhere in the world where personal 
computers are used or might be used. 
 
 The Commission’s “preliminary view” is that Intel 
violated the European anti-monopoly law by abusing its 
“dominant position with the aim of excluding its main rival, 
AMD...” from the X86 microprocessor chip market. Intel was 
charged with giving discriminatory payments or discounts to 
computer makers to induce them to boycott Intel’s only 
significant rival. The Commission also came to the 
“preliminary view” that Intel engaged in predatory pricing and 
paid firms not to carry its rivals’ chips. As the Commission 
observed, this was “bad news for competition and consumers.” 
Indeed, AMD asserts these abuses enabled Intel to overcharge 
consumers by $60 billion over the last decade. 
  
 One might, however, put a question to the Commission: if 
Intel offered discounts, payments, etc. to computer makers not 
to carry its rivals’ products, didn’t this money eventually 
get passed to consumers?  Regardless of their effects on 
competitors, isn’t Intel’s July 27 Statement that its 
payments, etc. have been “beneficial to consumers” correct?  
The problem is that Intel’s payments/discounts were shams. 
They lowered prices only after raising them.  Their only 
purpose was to hinder an equally efficient competitor. 
Although the Commission did not give detailed examples of the 
misconduct it is investigating, here’s how some of the alleged 
discounts work.   
 
 Imagine that Acme Computer buys 10 chips a month from 
Intel at $8 each. Suppose AMD wanted to sell chips to Acme, 
and offered to sell it 2 chips at $5 each.  These lower AMD 
prices certainly would be beneficial for competition and 
consumers. 
 
     Suppose, however, that when Acme turned to Intel for the 
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remaining 8 chips it needed, Intel replied that its prices had 
increased to $10 per chip, but that if Acme purchased all 10 
chips from Intel, their price would still only be $8 each.  
 
      Acme would quickly calculate that $8x10 = $10x8. In 
other words, under Intel’s new pricing plan it is giving away 
the last two chips for free.  It would make no sense for Acme 
to purchase any chips from AMD for $5 each, or even for 1¢ 
each. From Intel’s perspective it still gets the same $80 from 
Acme Computer. In addition, its carefully designed “discount” 
has excluded its would-be competitor. 
      
     This highly stylized rendition of part of the European 
Commission’s case shows how sham discounts can block entry and  
put even equally efficient rivals out of business. Now, 
consider these other allegations. An article in the British 
publication, “MicroScope,” cites a source close to Intel who 
reveals that Intel’s customers “received a pool of marketing 
money” to help them bid against other computer suppliers that 
use AMD chips. Also, in a lawsuit filed in the U.S. this year, 
Dell shareholders assert that Intel paid Dell $1 billion a 
year to boycott AMD. Further, in 2005 the Japan Fair Trade 
Commission ordered Intel to stop payments to Sony, Toshiba, 
NEC, Fujitsu, and Hitachi, to restrict severely their 
purchases from AMD. Intel agreed, but without admitting or 
denying the charges. Now the Korea Fair Trade Commission is 
investigating Intel’s conduct in its country.  These, along 
with the European Commission’s case, are all worthy inquiries.  
 
 No one knows why the Bush-appointed U.S. antitrust 
enforcers have not also filed a case against Intel.  
Regardless, chips are sold in a worldwide market, so if the 
European Commission succeeds in its case the European remedy 
almost certainly will have beneficial effects on chip sales in 
the United States. This remedy is likely to cause lower prices 
in the $33 billion/year chip market. This will especially 
benefit people outside the industrialized world, where there 
are vast numbers of people—including one billion children—for 
whom a computer is a luxury beyond reach. With more 
competition in the microprocessor market they-who have the 
most pressing needs for communications and computing power-
will more easily be able to afford to connect to the global 
village.  
 
 The long term consequences of a successful European case, 
moreover, are likely to be even more important. If Intel is  
permitted to succeed in its anticompetitive campaign one of 
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the world’s most critical industries might soon be monopolized 
completely and for the foreseeable future. In the long term 
Intel’s only true rival could be weakened so much that it no 
longer would be able to invest the immense amounts required to 
engage in the innovation and production facilities required to 
produce the next generation of chips. Moreover, without the 
spur of a rival, Intel’s incentives to innovate would fall 
substantially, and a dynamic industry could turn into a lazy 
monopolist. Consumers in the United States should be thankful 
the Europeans have taken this law enforcement action.  
 
 
